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THE OMBUDSMAN, TRIBUNALS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
SECTION 
Evolving standards in the complaints branch 
Richard Kirkham and Philip Wells  
School of Law, University of Sheffield, UK 
It is well known that dispute resolution schemes in the complaints branch, including 
ombudsman schemes and complaint-handlers, operate a very different dispute resolution 
methodology to that typically applied in the courts and tribunals. This methodology is 
widely accepted, but concerns have always existed regarding the fairness of the 
procedural safeguards deployed in the complaints branch. This article investigates two 
specific areas of procedural practice in the complaints branch: the openness of the sector 
in terms of the decisions that it makes and the grounds upon which they are made; and 
the capacity to review decisions made in the sector. The article argues that there is 
evidence that, whilst further refinement could be introduced, procedural safeguards in the 
sector are more robust than hitherto has been understood. 
Key words: administrative justice; procedural safeguards; transparency; internal review; 
ombudsman. 
     
Introduction 
Austerity politics is helping to change the justice landscape in the UK. The combined effect 
of such measures as the promotion of mediation and arbitration in family law (e.g. Norgrove 
2011), reduction in legal aid expenditure, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 and more onerous access restrictions on future claimants for judicial 
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review (Ministry of Justice 2012, 2013), is towards reducing our reliance on the courtroom 
for the provision of justice.1  It is doubtful that this trend will be reversed in the near future, 
as it builds upon a gradual shift away from court-based litigation which has been occurring 
for some years (Cornford and Sunkin 2001, Resnick 2004, Mulcahy 2013).  
One consequence of this overall policy move away from the courts is that ombudsman 
schemes and complaint systems in general have become increasingly central figures in the 
provision of both civil and administrative justice. The importance of the role performed by 
this sector, what is referred to in this article as the complaints branch, has been an evolving 
theme for at least 50 years. The EU Directive on alternative dispute resolution for consumer 
disputes (Directive 2013/11EU) will further heighten the centrality of the role of the 
complaints branch.  
However, concerns remain about the capacity of the complaints branch to handle its 
upgraded role and a number of studies have revealed areas where significant improvement is 
required, particularly in the administrative justice system (e.g. NAO 2005, Simmons and 
Brennan 2013). Many of the issues facing the complaints branch are practical or cultural in 
nature, such as the need to tackle its alleged complexity, to enhance its accessibility and to 
make better use of the information derived from complaints to drive improvements in service 
provision.2 But another strand of concern is the quality of justice provided. In the ombudsman 
sector, the work of several ombudsman schemes has been subject to criticism and scrutiny 
over the years by former users of their service, and this has included unease with the fairness 
of the processes adopted.3 Such scrutiny of the ombudsman sector has been repeated in 
Parliament on more than one occasion (e.g. CLG 2012).  
Partly in response to such critical exposure, ombudsman and complaint-handling schemes 
actively seek ways to strengthen their model of dispute resolution and perceptions of it. This 
article explores two such strategic initiatives currently being pursued in the complaints 
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branch which have received little if any attention outside of the complaint-handling 
community itself. First, some ombudsman schemes have adopted a policy of publishing on 
their website all the decisions that they make. The objective here is to increase transparency 
in decision-making. Second, whereas almost all complaint systems have for some time had 
internal processes in place to consider complaints against their decisions, several schemes 
have moved towards adding an external element to this process. Here the aim is to promote 
accountability to uncover faults that occur with the service provided.   
The article starts by outlining the core theoretical problems involved in establishing 
appropriate standards in the complaints branch of our system of justice, and considers the 
issues of transparency and internal review processes in more detail. Evidence of current 
practice in the complaints branch is then presented. Overall, the argument is made that a 
change in practice is occurring in the complaints branch. Moreover, although neither the 
move towards enhanced transparency or more objective internal review is particularly radical 
when compared to the procedural safeguards embedded within the legal process operated in 
courts, both herald a significant progression in the standards adopted in the complaints branch.   
  
Procedural standards applied in the complaints branch 
This article refers to standards in the complaints branch generally, but is primarily focussed 
on two distinct types of institution: ombudsman and complaint-handling schemes. For the 
purposes of this article, reference to ombudsman schemes include dispute resolution bodies 
which are independently appointed and represent the last stage in the complaints branch.4 By 
contrast, reference to complaint-handling schemes includes: 
x Intermediate complaint-handlers that have been set-up in a quasi-independent fashion 
and are contractually employed by a service provider to investigate complaints about 
them; 
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x Complaint-handlers set up and appointed by a Government department; 
x Industry complaint-handling schemes set up by a service sector to receive complaints 
about the service provided in that sector, but which for one reason or another lack full 
independence.  
Ombudsman and complaint-handling schemes perform similar roles in a number of 
respects, in particular they have been designed to operate in a manner which is distinct from 
the methodology familiarly employed within courts and tribunals. This methodology is 
accompanied by different procedural expectations which for some raise questions about the 
fairness and appropriateness of dispute resolution in the complaints branch.    
The differences in process adopted in the courts and the complaints branch respectively 
are largely attributable to the subtly different objectives being pursued. While the primary 
and almost sole objective of the courts is to provide for justice in a demonstrably fair manner 
that inspires public confidence, the goal of the complaints branch is usually understood to be 
more pragmatic and possibly more in tune with the socio-legal context that the justice system 
operates within. The core objective of a complaint-handler can be summarised as the 
resolution of disputes in a manner which is accessible and fair to all complainants, applies a 
methodology which is inquisitorial and not adversarial, and provides a cost-efficient and 
prompt method of dispute resolution.  
The embedded role of the complaints branch in modern systems of justice has been given 
strong support by the EU directive on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes.  
 
As advocated by the European Parliament in its resolutions of 25 October 2011 on alternative dispute 
resolution in civil, commercial and family matters and of 20 May 2010 on delivering a single market to 
consumers and citizens, any holistic approach to the single market which delivers results for its citizens 
should as a priority develop simple, affordable, expedient and accessible system of redress. (para.8) 
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Such goals of simplicity, affordability, expediency and accessibility seem to require a 
choice of redress mechanisms for a wide variety of disputes. Indeed, many of the benefits of 
the dispute resolution method deployed in the complaints branch would likely be lost were 
the procedural requirements adopted by the courts to be imposed upon the complaint-
handling community. To paraphrase the words of Lord Justice Mummery in a case on the 
Office of the Independent Adjudicator, if the ombudsman is to be required to: 
 
«DFWDVDVXUURJDWHRIWKH«FRXUW«LWLVGLIILFXOWWRVHHZKDWSRLQWWKHUHZRXOGEHLQKDYLQJDVFKHPH
ZKLFK ZDV HVWDEOLVKHG « QRW DV DQRWKHU FRXUW RI ODZ RU WULEXQDO EXW DV D PRUH XVHU IULHQGO\ DQG
DIIRUGDEOH DOWHUQDWLYH SURFHGXUH IRU DLULQJ « complaints and grievances. The judicialisation of the 
[ombudsman] so that it has to perform the same fact-finding functions and to make the same decisions on 
liability as the ordinary courts and tribunals would not be in the interests of [complainants] generally 
[Shelly Maxwell v The Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education [2011] EWCA Civ 
1236, at [37-8] per Lord Justice Mummery]. 
 
But although complaint-handling schemes can legitimately operate differently, fairness in 
the resolution of disputes remains paramount for all the usual reasons, above all in order to 
retain public confidence in the process. It is important, therefore, that due process is 
embedded within complaints processes somehow, but it is not necessary for it to be 
implemented in the same manner as the judicial method. This article examines the efforts of 
the complaint-handling community to demonstrate and deliver due process in two 
fundamental respects: transparency of decision-making and dealing with complaints about its 
service. In both areas, well-versed concerns about the complaint-handling process exist.  
 
Transparency in decision-making 
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Many of the procedural concerns that are sometimes expressed about the complaint-handling 
process are encapsulated by the criticism that it lacks transparency. Decisions are not made in 
open court and most of the communications between the complaint-handler and the 
respective parties take place in private and without any required notice to the other party. 
Decisions are arrived at by the complaint-handler on the basis of the information that they 
have received, following inquiries conducted of its volition. In the public sector at least, 
complaint-handlers also make recommendations as to remedy in the knowledge that often the 
body complained against has the discretion whether or not to implement the remedy. The 
concealed nature of this process leads to a suspicion that an element of negotiation between 
the complaint-handler and the body complained against might enter into the process of 
finalising recommendations, possibly to the detriment of the complainant. Such concerns are 
heightened by the lack of procedural right for the respective parties to cross-examine the 
arguments of the other. Indeed, for the complainant, once the complaint has been submitted 
he or she is duty bound to rely upon the integrity and competence of the complaint-handler in 
the resolution of the dispute.    
The opaqueness of the decision-making process is made more problematic by the lack of 
detail in the criteria by which decisions are arrived at. Complaint-handling schemes tend to 
work off a remit that grants them significant flexibility in the manner in which they come to 
their findings. Public services ombudsman schemes can make findings on the grounds that 
µPDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶, µXQGXH KDUGVKLS¶ RU µVHUYLFH IDLOXUH¶. For many complaint-handling 
schemes the list of grounds offered is longer but does not necessarily add much by way of 
finer detail. Beyond brief descriptions, the grounds for finding administrative fault have never 
been detailed in law, either by statute or the courts, and leave the complaint-handler with 
much flexibility in interpretation and application. While the technique is justifiable (Buck et 
al 2011, chs.2 and 4), the process retains a mysterious element which is hard to explain to the 
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user and thereby in conflict with the supposedly user-friendly approach the schemes are 
trying to embrace and represent.    
Finally, not only are the grounds by which decisions are made rather loose, but complaint-
handling schemes do not operate a system of precedent. Albeit it is inevitable that equivalent 
investigations will lead to a certain degree of institutional knowledge and shared 
understanding developing internally in a complaint-handling scheme, such shared knowledge 
is not necessarily made available to potential users. Nor is there a body of what might be 
WHUPHG µRPEXGVPDQSUXGHQFH¶ HTXLYDOHQW WR WKH VWXG\ RI OHJDO FDVes that might support a 
wider understanding of the interpretations applied by complaint schemes. In this scenario, the 
allegation made against complaint schemes that is hard to rebut is that inconsistent decision-
making is a probable outcome. 
 
Dealing with complaints against complaint-handlers 
Another familiar concern with complaint-handling schemes is that they do not contain an 
adequate opportunity to challenge the decisions made by compliant-handlers. This is a 
critique which applies more to ombudsman schemes than other complaint-handlers. Often 
with complaint-handlings schemes, once the decision is made there will be a right to pursue a 
complaint afresh with an independent ombudsman.  
Ombudsman schemes in the UK can be subject to judicial review through the courts, but 
as opposed to an appeal process the purpose of judicial review of an ombudsman scheme is to 
test whether or not the ombudsman has exercised its powers in accordance with the law. 
Further, the success rate for claimants through judicial review against ombudsman schemes is 
particularly low, suggesting that the judiciary have established a very high level of deference 
to the decision-making of ombudsman schemes.5 This does not necessarily render the process 
an ineffective accountability route, as studies have found that judicial review proceedings do 
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often bring about a changed response from public bodies in out of court settlements (Bondy 
and Sunkin 2009). Similarly, one study has revealed that as a result of judicial review 
proceedings brought against ombudsman schemes, out of court settlements have led to 
investigations being reopened as a result (Thomas et al 2013, p. 72).  
Nevertheless, given the cost and general inconvenience to the complainant of commencing 
judicial review proceedings, it is unwise to place too much reliance on it as the solution to 
ombudsman accountability (Buck et al 2011, pp. 175-177). Moreover, the frustration for 
users of the ombudsman with existing arrangements is that they do not allow for the merits of 
the decision of the ombudsman to be tested in full. After all, ombudsman schemes are as 
capable of fallibility as any other method of dispute resolution, and given that complainants 
may not get a significant opportunity to participate in the ombudsman investigation it can 
appear unfair that they are also denied the means of effective appeal.  
For the merits of an ombudsman decision to be capable of challenge an appeal process 
would be required which allowed a considerably wider array of factors to be considered than 
in judicial review. But such an appeal process is generally thought inappropriate for an 
ombudsman system as it contradicts the objectives that underpin the introduction of 
ombudsman schemes and, where applicable, their current legislative design. Several 
arguments are regularly raised in objection to including appeal processes within ombudsman 
arrangements. 
First, were there to be a process of appeal which allowed for a full reconsideration of all 
aspects of the decision of the ombudsman process and the overturning of the discretionary 
judgment of an ombudsman, it would risk undermining the LQVWLWXWLRQ¶V credibility. Without a 
thorough filtering process to restrict the flow of complaints to the appeal stage, the possibility 
would arise of the ombudsman process being used simply as a stepping stone to the appeal 
stage. Moreover, it is uncertain what that filtering process could entail, other than to apply 
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much the same standards already applied in judicial review, ie the existence of strong 
evidence that the ombudsman had erred in law. 
A second objection follows from the first, namely that a right of appeal might lead to a 
judicial process being super imposed on the ombudsman process. If the appeal process 
allowed for the respective parties to interrogate evidence, cross-examine the arguments of the 
other side and re-RSHQDOO DVSHFWVRI WKHRPEXGVPDQ¶V LQYHVWLJDWLRQ, then this arrangement 
would be entirely incompatible with the ombudsman role and method 7KH RPEXGVPDQ¶V
work, therefore, would be trumped and overridden by a fresh form of dispute resolution. By 
contrast, the outcome of an unfavourable judgment in judicial review is that the ombudsman 
is required to reopen its investigation but control of the final decision is retained by the 
ombudsman. Thus in judicial review the work of the ombudsman is called to account but not 
replaced.  
One response to the two previous objections might be that the appeal route operated could 
EH WR DQRWKHU RPEXGVPDQ VFKHPH D IRUP RI µVXSHU¶ RPEXGVPDQ EXW KHUH WZR IXUWKHU
generic objections apply.  
First, any appeal process built into an ombudsman scheme would lead to disproportionate 
dispute resolution if it allowed for an additional stage to occur after an ombudsman 
investigation had already been completed. The prospect would arise of a complaint being 
considered and rejected first by an internal complaints process, then possibly by an 
intermediate complaint handler, thereafter by an ombudsman and then by an appeal, with 
presumably the potential for judicial review to follow.  
Finally, aQ DSSHDO SURFHVV ZRXOG XQGHUPLQH WKH ³ODVW UHVRUW´ UROH RI DQ ombudsman 
system, not least the benefits of finality. The ombudsman is a scheme specifically designed to 
provide a final independent conclusion to an administrative justice dispute, subject to the 
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capacity for judicial review. This objective would be destroyed by an appeals process and 
would extend even further the timeline for resolving administrative justice disputes.  
Arguments for creating an appeal stage in the ombudsman process, therefore, run against 
the background goal of establishing an overall system of justice that allows for a range of 
different dispute resolution processes appropriate for the different forms of dispute that occur. 
Accordingly, where Parliament has made a decision not to establish a bespoke form of 
tribunal to deal with complaints against service provision and instead the primary grievance 
handling route is through an ombudsman, then the concept of building an appeal route into 
the ombudsman arrangement appears contradictory and undermining if that appeal route is to 
take a judicial form. Further, even if the form of appeal process operates in line with the same 
ombudsman methodology as the ombudsman being appealed against, it leads to the formation 
of a system that is both costly and time-consuming. There is also the likelihood of significant 
negative side-effects as justice gets delayed and disproportionately weighted towards 
appeasing complainants who are unwilling to accept the administrative justice determinations 
that two or three different complaint processes within the system have delivered. Overall, the 
pressure of an appeal process on ombudsman schemes might be to increase costs and slow 
down proceedings.    
But securing satisfactory accountability of ombudsman schemes is an issue of 
constitutional concern, as well as inextricably linked to the objective of securing fairness in 
decision-making. As a public body with considerable discretionary power to investigate 
disputes of considerable value to complainants and the bodies investigated alike, the need for 
some form of scrutiny of ombudsman decisions is strong. 
 
Raising the standards: developments within the complaints branch 
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The previous section identified potential weaknesses in the model of dispute resolution 
employed in the complaints branch, but also argued that the very different standards of 
fairness that apply in the complaint-handling process to that adopted by the courts are 
defensible. This is a conclusion that has been supported on numerous occasions by the courts 
(Buck et al 2011, pp.175-177), leading to the argument that the status of the complaints 
branch within the overall system of justice is increasingly of an embedded and constitutional 
nature (Abraham 2008).  
However, even if the status of the complaints branch is strong, there remains an onus on 
schemes within it to operate to the highest standards possible within the confines of the logic 
of the role that they are set out to perform. This article explores current practice in the 
complaints branch in two distinct respects, to inquire whether standards in the sector are more 
robust than previously understood.   
 
Openness 
In meeting the challenge to raise standards, one response that could be deployed by members 
of the complaints branch is to be more open about the results of their work and the grounds 
upon which they make decisions. With most schemes, while there is an obligation to notify 
the respective parties of the reasons for a decision, there is no obligation to publish those 
decisions more widely. In the past, practice in this area has varied considerably from scheme 
to scheme, with for many years publication of decisions restricted by the costs of publication 
and the likelihood of anyone paying much attention to the results. The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman and Health Service Ombudsman (PO/HSO), for instance, for years published a 
quarterly digest of reports completed but stopped the practice in 2001 (Parliamentary 
Ombudsman 2002). Since then selected extracts from reports have been reproduced in the 
annual reports and others have been reproduced in special reports, but many individual 
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investigations have gone unpublished. Until very recently, the Local Government 
Ombudsman (LGO) has adopted a similar approach, using selected cases to illustrate or 
explain the work of the office in digests of cases or factsheets, but has not offered access to 
the full range of completed investigations. The uncertainty surrounding decision-making in 
the sector is made more marked by the trend over time towards resolving complaints at the 
pre-report stage, often by way of a letter rather than a formally completed report (Buck et al 
2011, ch.4). The outcomes of such early redress have often not been published.  
Transparency is frequently argued as the cure to governance problems and one should 
perhaps be wary of overstating its remedial qualities. But the strength of the connections 
between the benefits to be gained from transparency and the perceived weaknesses in the 
complaint-handling operation do provide strong grounds for believing that more openness 
about the decision-making process of complaint-handlers could significantly improve 
confidence in complaint-handling schemes.  
One of the key accusations that has been levelled at complaint-handling schemes is that 
there is a lack of evidence of consistency in decision-making, leading to further concerns that 
decision-making can be arbitrary. Publishing all decisions offers complaint-handling schemes 
a number of means by which to provide a riposte to this critique. Open access to all decisions 
made might, for instance, demonstrate the heavily context dependent nature of decision-
making in the complaint-handling process. In other words, it might reveal how difficult 
comparing different cases really is and how hard it is to substantiate any accusation of 
inconsistency. Likewise it might demonstrate the potential futility of operating a doctrine of 
precedent. Alternatively, an opposite result might come about that reveals that comparable 
cases can be identified with sufficient regularity to enable an assessment of whether or not 
consistent decision-making does occur within complaint-handling schemes. If there is 
sufficient comparability of complaints handled then consistent decision-making should be an 
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essential aspiration of a complaint-handling scheme, with that goal being facilitated by robust 
internal quality control processes to achieve consistent outputs. Transparency, therefore, will 
either have the benefit of revealing the consistent nature of decision-making that exists or 
provide the added motivation needed to force complaint-handling schemes to upgrade their 
internal quality control processes to achieve consistency.     
Similarly, transparency in decision-making could directly address another generic concern 
with the complaint-handling process, namely that not enough is known about the reasoning 
behind the decisions made and the perception that the process is too subjective. The degree of 
discretion and interpretation implicit in the complaint-handling model is significant, but the 
process is supported by a strong onus on the complaint-handler to support his/her decision 
with good evidence that rationally explains the final decision according to overall principles 
of the scheme. With the output of the complaint-handling process on public display and 
supported by evidence of sound reasoning, it would be much harder to dismiss the work 
undertaken as unprincipled. 
Finally, transparency in decision-making might also help explain, and provide more 
meaning to, the principles that complaint-handling schemes are working towards. Such 
messages already exist on the websites of most complaint-handling schemes in the form of 
general guidance, fact sheets and other efforts to inform the user of the approach adopted 
within a scheme. Matching these claims to a body of completed investigations is the most 
obvious way of demonstrating the coherency of the thought-process that goes into resolving 
disputes in complaint-handling schemes. 
Overall, a policy of publishing decisions made within a complaint-handling scheme should 
not aspire to replicate all features of the classic legal approach. In particular, requiring the 
reasoning to be applied to follow precedents goes against the standard complaint-handling 
method which has always sought more flexibility. Nevertheless, publicising more detailed 
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guidance on the criteria applied in making decisions, alongside publishing decisions, might 
be beneficial in committing complaint-handlers to demonstrate an appropriately directed 
rational justification for their decision-making. The existence of the internet provides the 
means of deploying such a strategy which overrides many of the concerns about the 
practicality of making such information available, as might have existed previously.  
 
Internal and external review 
As argued in an earlier section, there are very sound reasons for not conceding to the need for 
an appeal process to be embedded within ombudsman schemes. However, in a bid to promote 
accountability, most ombudsman schemes have voluntarily pursued the option of introducing 
their own in-house complaint processes to deal with complaints made against them. Internal 
review processes risk increasing the costs of the service provided and delaying further the 
point at which a complaint can finally be closed, nevertheless, they can be designed to meet 
some of the other reasons used to justify not including appeal processes within ombudsman 
schemes.  
First, as will be described shortly, most ombudsman schemes have devised guidance on 
which complaints will be accepted for internal review. This strategy has allowed a rational 
filtering process to be integrated into the internal review arrangement to prevent it becoming 
overloaded.  
Second, almost all such processes make it clear that the purpose of the internal complaint 
process is not to reconsider the merits of the case. At its most challenging, the internal 
complaints process is designed to identify those investigations that may need to be reopened 
because of some flaw in the initial investigation or new information has come to light that 
was not previously taken into account. It might be argued that this process only replicates the 
task undertaken in judicial review, and in an inferior form. The advantage of the internal 
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review process though is that it offers a significantly more realistic option for the complainant, 
as evidenced by the numbers of such reviews that take place when compared to claims for 
judicial review,6 and does not affect the right of a complainant to pursue a judicial review. 
Third, the process of review does not invite an entirely new set of criteria or a separate 
forum to override the previous ombudsman investigation. Instead, if the request for a review 
is upheld, the process may lead to the decision of the ombudsman being slightly altered or the 
original investigation reopened. Such a remedial approach allows the integrity of the 
ombudsman model to be preserved.  
An internal process of review cannot achieve the same appearance of fairness as an 
external review process. Thus the internal review may be a genuine attempt to bolster the 
legitimacy of ombudsman decision-making, but it will always suffer from the perception that 
the process is inherently bias towards the original decision-maker. This is a difficult argument 
to counter but, in terms of improving the soundness of decision-making within ombudsman 
schemes and identifying flaws that may otherwise not yet have been revealed, there are three 
reasons to be optimistic about the value of the internal review solution.  
First, the statistics that are now being published by ombudsman schemes as a matter of 
course suggest that internal review processes do reveal flaws and do lead to remedies in 
favour of the complainant.7  
Second, some ombudsman schemes have taken the concept further and employ an external 
person to act as their complaints reviewer. Given that such arrangements are set up on a 
contractual basis they cannot be considered as equivalent to a full independent complaint 
route, but it is an interesting innovation worthy of further investigation.  
Finally, if one considers the way that many ombudsman schemes have evolved, there 
exists a strong interest on the part of the head of the scheme, namely the ombudsman, in 
using the internal review processes to enhance the control arrangements within the scheme. In 
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days gone by, it would commonly have been the case that the ombudsman would have signed 
off the vast majority of resolved complaints and have been actively involved in their 
consideration. In other words, there was an in-built incentive for an ombudsman not to 
expose his/her decision-making to external scrutiny beyond what was necessary to comply 
with the law. Today, however, most of the large scale ombudsman schemes operate a very 
different managerial structure with a considerable amount of delegated responsibility built 
into them. One result is that most ombudsmen handle very few complaints themselves and 
are preoccupied with the higher level responsibility of ensuring that the external profile of the 
scheme is healthy and the internal business design of the organisation is fit for purpose. With 
regard to both core aspirations, a robust internal review process provides the ombudsman 
overseeing the scheme with an important additional tool of quality control with which (a) to 
find out if decision-making within her organisation is flawed and can be exposed if necessary 
and (b) to provide an added element of pressure on staff to maintain high standards.        
 
Current practice in the complaints branch 
To what extent have these ideas as to best practice in complaint-handling been embraced in 
the complaints branch of the justice system in the UK and Northern Ireland? In order to find 
out, this article uses as its main point of reference the membership of the Ombudsman 
Association (OA).8 The OA is a representative association and is widely considered the 8.¶V 
dominant authority on complaint-handling with over sixty members, albeit not all are UK or 
Northern Ireland schemes. The OA is a relevant source of authority not just because of the 
range of its membership, but also because of its declared aspiration. Amongst other things, 
WKH2$¶VREMHFWVDUHWRµdefine, publish and keep under review criteria for the recognition of 
RPEXGVPDQRIILFHVE\ WKH$VVRFLDWLRQ¶DQG WR µIDFLOLWDWHPXWXDO OHDUQLQJEHWZHHQVFKHPHV
and to provide services to members designed to develop best practice¶.9 The OA, therefore, 
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aspires to promote standards in the field, with the most significant manifestation of this work 
the Criteria which are used to test membership applications to the Association (Ombudsman 
Association 2011). In the absence of any detailed statutory or judicial instruction on the 
standards that should exist in the complaints branch, the OA is a natural starting point. 
In this study, the work of the OA towards standards in the sector is not fully evaluated as it 
only offers limited detail on both the issues of transparency and internal review. In one sense 
this is a frustrating outcome, but the OA is a voluntary association of complaint schemes and 
its membership is made up of very different schemes in terms of size, remit, authority, history 
and status. Partly to facilitate such diversity, the OA has made it clear that its role is not to act 
as a regulatory organisation, but instead one that promotes and encourages best practice 
through internal debate and the spread of ideas.  
To get a better understanding of how the complaints branch deals with the issues of 
transparency and reviewing complaints made against them, therefore, direct reference must 
be made to existing practice. To demonstrate the variety of practice in the sector, in the 
research for this article we looked at a large proportion of the membership schemes of the OA. 
Some OA schemes were excluded from analysis due to difficulties in accessing the relevant 
information,10 but additionally several non-OA schemes were included in the study.11 This 
latter collection of complaint-handlers demonstrates both the lack of coordinated oversight of 
the sector and the range of different bodies that are involved in complaint-handling.  
Overall, forty five schemes were tested to ascertain their publically stated policy on the 
two areas outlined above: transparency and internal review. The information that formed the 
basis of this study purely referred to information that is readily available on the website. This 
was a deliberate choice for the reason that for both categories of inquiry ± transparency and 
internal review ± the value of the additional procedural safeguards would be much reduced if 
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not made publically known. In turn, we have taken the website as the best proxy evidence for 
DVFKHPH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRPDNHSXEOLFLWVDSSURDFKWRWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGUHYLHZ 
In the absence of any formal set of standards in the sector, OA guidance and wider best 
practice publications on complaint-handling were reviewed to identify relevant procedural 
safeguards frequently cited as examples of good practice (eg PHSO 2007, LGO 2009, SPSO 
2011). From these sources, a series of procedural aspects enmeshed within the complaint-
handling process were selected as relevant areas for scrutiny. The following analysis explains 
the rationale for those choices and the practice currently adopted within the complaints 
branch. Other choices of analysis could have been made, but this study aspires only to offer 
an initial picture of any evolutionary patterns in the complaints branch rather than a 
comprehensive review.12  
 
Transparency in decision-making  
Although the guidance of the OA does not go into great detail on the standards of openness in 
decision-making that should apply in the sector, it does lay out the arguments for 
transparency.  
 
It is good practice to set out clearly what the scheme can and cannot do, as well as the processes and 
procedures used to review a complaint. So far as it is possible and practicable, final determinations 
should be published in a way that enables everyone concerned to understand the evidence, the application 
RI UXOHV DQG SROLFLHV DQG WKH UHDVRQV IRU DQ\ FRQFOXVLRQV UHDFKHG « 6RPH VFKHPHV PDNH WKHLU
determinations public and, where this is the case, they should be available for convenient reference by 
their stakeholders, who should also have easy access to the policies (BIOA 2007, p. 18). 
 
Every complaint is unique to the complainant and should be considered on its own merits. However, 
complaint reviewers should try to make decisions that are consistent. This does not imply treating past 
decisions as binding precedents where circumstances merit a different outcome. Rather, it places an onus 
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on the scheme to promote fairness of treatment. Some schemes demonstrate this by publishing past 
decisions and ensuring that they are accessible to staff and the public policies (BIOA 2007, p. 26).  
 
To ascertain the standards currently applied in the sector, from this broad statement, we 
drew out two key questions to explore further. 
 
1. Does the scheme publish guidance on its decision-making criteria? If so, how extensive is 
the information provided? 
Unsurprisingly, all the complaint-handling schemes that were studied in this work did use the 
internet as an opportunity to explain both the process of inquiry that the scheme adopted and 
the formal criteria applied in making decisions. Although this is a positive outcome, in terms 
of developing user-friendly standards, a basic requirement that the formal decision-making 
criteria is published is of only limited value. If the objective is to inform potential users of the 
VHUYLFHDVWRWKHVFKHPH¶VPHWKRGVa complaint-handler needs to go further. For this study, 
we identified three separate approaches followed by schemes in their attempts to clarify the 
criteria that they applied in their decision-making. Although the interpretations we applied in 
our research contained an element of subjectivity, these three distinct approaches reveal 
significant disparities in the degree of further information made available by schemes.  
 
Formal criteria provided in outline only: Of the 45 ombudsman/complaint-handler 
schemes evaluated for this study, we concluded that for 12 the information provided was 
relatively limited in terms of explaining the decision-making criteria employed. Information 
provided usually centred on the main role and remit of the scheme, such as providing an 
outline of the test of maladministration and a few examples as to what it might mean, but 
made available little more by way of detail to provide further assistance to individuals 
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wishing to complain. We found that although the processes of complaint were ordinarily 
explained well, it would have been difficult from the information provided on the website 
alone to comprehend the likelihood of success in complaining or how best to construct a 
complaint.  
 
Extensive provision of examples and assistance: We found that 19 schemes used the 
website to outline both the role and remit of the office and to provide more detailed and 
advanced information on how the range of issues that were considered might be implemented. 
Thus frequently schemes make available fact sheets, examples and case studies to provide 
some meaning to the tests applied by the scheme. A particularly good example of the 
JXLGDQFH WKDW FDQ EH SURYLGHG LV WKH /HJDO 2PEXGVPDQ¶V µWHPSODWH OHWWHU RI FRPSODLQW¶
which provides users when constructing a complaint with a structured set of issues to address 
and explain.13    
 
Provision and publication of a Code:  Alongside guidance and examples, we found 
that 14 of the complaint-handling schemes that we looked at made available codes of practice 
or codes of assessment to demonstrate in more detail the decision-making criteria applied. 
This strategy has been a common feature of private service ombudsman schemes for some 
time, but is now beginning to occur in public service schemes as well, as for example with 
WKHµ$VVHVVPHQW&RGH¶XVHGE\the Local Government Ombudsman which was introduced in 
2013. Other ombudsman schemes have introduced principles of good administration, which 
although primarily targeted at the bodies being investigated do also provide an indication of 
the standards being applied by complaint-handlers. 
Although it would be an unlawful fetter of powers to apply rigidly such codes, one could 
envisage codes having the benefit of establishing a form of internal accountability and 
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measure of consistency in decision-making. In turn, such codes might offer value to 
complainants wishing to understand better what will be used to assess their claim; and 
therefore, how best to structure their claim and demonstrate what they believe to be the merits 
of their particular complaint. The effectiveness of such codes in all these respects needs to be 
tested, but the initiative of having a code of practice or code of assessment seems an overtly 
clear way to enhance the transparency of the complaint process.  
 
2. Does the scheme publish all (or most) of its decisions? 
There is no clear standard of publication within the complaints branch and in this study we 
found a number of different strategies pursued. What we did found though was some 
evidence off a shift towards a general policy of openness in the sector. 
 
Full publication: The most open strategy employed was one of full publication of all 
decisions made, including in some instances complaints settled without formal investigation. 
We found that 10 schemes out of 45 reviewed for this study had a fully open publication 
policy for all decisions. Two of the largest schemes, the Financial Ombudsman Service and 
the Local Government Ombudsman, had committed to this strategy during the previous year. 
With such a policy only the prospect of future legal action or a need to retain the anonymity 
of the complainant will justify the non-publication of a decision.14  
 
Selective publication of decisions:  A more selective publication strategy is operated by 
most other complaint-handling schemes. With this strategy, decisions are published but not 
the full range. This might be for a variety of reasons, such as the extra cost involved in 
compiling such information or a perceived need to protect the confidentiality of the bodies (or 
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individuals) complained against. The concern is, however, that an additional reason for non-
disclosure might be a lack of confidence in the robustness or consistency of decision-making.    
Of the 45 schemes analysed for this study we found that 23 published some, albeit a 
limited amount, of information about their decisions. This information often took the form of 
case studies or small summaries/digests of their decisions, whether in the annual report or on 
the website. The limited publication strategy does not enable any external verification of the 
consistency of decision-making but does at least provide individuals with a solid 
understanding of the type and nature of complaints that the complaint-handler will be able to 
deal with.    
 
No decisions published: The least open strategy of all is adopted by schemes that only 
provide reference to the types of cases they deal with and do not provide any useful case 
studies or meaningful digests. We found that 12 schemes studied fell into this category. In an 
era when publishing information online is quick and easy, and highly accessible to the target 
audience, the failure to provide at least case studies on their websites is difficult to justify on 
a resources basis.     
 
Reviewing decisions of complaint-handlers and ombudsman schemes 
An effective complaints handling procedure is appropriately and clearly communicated, easily 
understood and available to all. 
Complaints should be welcomed by informed and empowered staff. 
A complaints procedure should be well publicised. 
A complaints procedure should be easily understood without any specialist knowledge. 
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A complaints procedure should be designed with regard to the needs of minority and vulnerable groups. 
Where appropriate, service providers should make available material and support to help people access 
and use the procedure (SPSO 2011, p. 2).   
 
As with transparency in decision-making, there is little formal guidance to be found on the 
procedures that should be in place for internal review processes. The summary of good 
practice in complaint-handling from the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman cited above 
provides a useful starting point, but in our tests we have gone a little further in following 
through the logic of a meaningful complaints process. 
 
1. Is the ability for a decision of the complaint-handler to be externally reviewed (whether 
that be to an ombudsman scheme or to the courts) publically advertised?   
Procedural transparency should entail making complainants aware of the opportunities to 
pursue their complaint once the complaint-handler has concluded its investigations. This is a 
point emphasised by complaint-handlers in their work with investigated bodies, and in turn it 
would be inconsistent for complaint-handlers not to be open about any future routes of 
complaint. Being open with complainants about the potential to pursue a complaint further 
does remove some of the finality that is associated with ombudsman schemes but it is a core 
accountability requirement.        
Of the 45 schemes tested, we found that all bar 6 schemes were fully transparent on the 
website about the next external stage in the complaint cycle. For most of the 6 schemes that 
did not make this information clear there was no clear redress route left after its decision had 
been finalised.  
We found some variance in the degree of transparency deployed in explaining the 
subsequent legal routes available, but where there was an overlap between the work of 
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complaint-handlers and other legal options we found some good examples of those options 
being explained.  
 
2. Is the capacity for the complainant to have the decision of the complaint handler internally 
reviewed publically advertised?  
To optimise the transparency value of an internal review process it should be easily known to 
would-be complainants. This statement of good practice is backed up in best practice 
guidance on complaints systems, as produced by ombudsman schemes themselves (eg PHSO 
2007, pp. 6-7, LGO 2009, p. 2). Perhaps surprisingly, we found that this was an area where 
many complaint-handling schemes were not fully transparent.  
 
Advertised on the website: Communication of the right to complaint could occur by a 
number of means. The most transparent means is to advertise the internal review process on 
the website. Out of the 45 tested schemes we found that only 28 schemes advertised their 
internal review process clearly on their websites. Even within this category, accessibility to 
the relevant information on the internal review process varied between schemes, with some 
websites considerably less helpful on the matter than others.  
 
Internal reviews not publically advertised: We found that 17 complaint-handlers did not 
publically advertise an internal complaints process on the website. For this study we did not 
inquire further about any processes that may be in place, although noted that in some cases 
information about internal review processes was referred to in other published documents, 
such as annual reports.  
It is unlikely that internal review processes are not in place, simply because they are not 
advertised on the website. However, the absence of an express reference to an internal review 
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process on the website does illustrate the conservative approach to the matter traditionally 
taken within the sector, an approach borne out of a fear that such a strategy might encourage 
complainants to perceive the complaint handling process as simply an intermediate stage. For 
ombudsman schemes in particular, this viewpoint should be considered within the context of 
their position in the complaints cycle. Ombudsman schemes generally have a duty, often 
confirmed in statute, to operate as a dispute resolution body of last resort. As such, part of 
their role is to bring closure to a dispute, to inform the complainant that however much 
sympathy they may have for WKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VFLUFXPVWDQFHV in law there is no validity to 
WKHLUFRPSODLQW7RRSHQXSWKDWµILQDO¶GHFLVLRQWRIXUWKHUUHYLHZWKHUHIRUHULVNVSURORQJLQJ
the dispute even further, with all the unsatisfactory consequences that follow from that. 
Moreover, it cannot be ignored that some complainants are serial complainers and/or may 
have psychological issues that ultimately have to be confronted and not merely appeased 
through the provision of yet another opportunity to complain (New South Wales Ombudsman 
2012).  
With such concerns in mind, an alternative option by which to communicate the right to a 
review to complainants is through verbal or written communication with the complainant 
either when the complaint is first made or at a later stage in the process. The least transparent 
option of all is only to make the option to review known to the complainant once the 
complainant goes to the trouble of inquiring about the review process.  
       
3. Are the criteria by which the complaint-handler decides which complaints can be 
internally reviewed publically advertised?   
One of the challenges for internal review processes is to establish rational criteria by which 
appropriate requests for review are filtered into the review process. Of the 28 schemes tested 
that advertised their internal review process on the website, we found that 20 schemes 
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published the criteria by which such requests for the internal review would be considered. 
While this is generally a positive figure, we found that the information provided was often 
short and limited, and did not provide for the user particularly detailed information on what 
the scheme will consider when evaluating the internal review.  
 
4. Does the complaint-handler accept complaints about service standards, procedural 
standards and/or merits of the original decision? 
Following on from the previous test, the choice of criteria by which to consider requests for 
internal review is important. The criteria should not be too extensive, otherwise the process 
will become too burdensome on the organisation and risk encouraging the expectations of the 
complainant. On the other hand, the criteria need to have some bite otherwise the internal 
review process will appear to be protective of the organisation and will have less chance of 
gaining the confidence of the complainant. 
Of the schemes tested that advertised on the website the criteria used in their internal 
review process, we found that no schemes seemed to offer to review the substance or the 
merits of the original decision. However, a number of schemes used elusive language, such as 
³LI\RXDUHQRWKDSS\ZLWKWKHGHFLVLRQ´ZLWKRXWIXOO\articulating whether or not substantive 
matters can be considered for an internal review.  
In relation to procedural aspects, such as complaints against inadequate service or general 
procedural failures within the complaint-handler scheme, all bar two schemes made it clear 
that they were willing to allow internal reviews based on procedural and service issues.   
 
5. Are the potential outcomes of internal review publically advertised? What are they?     
Along with the criteria to be applied, an important feature of the internal review process that 
the complainant will want to know is the potential outcomes.  
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Of the 28 schemes tested that advertised their internal review process on the website, we 
found that only 3 provided full detail on the potential remedies that they made available if a 
request for review was upheld. 7 schemes provided some limited information but often only 
listed one example and tended to mention the issue in passing rather than dedicate space to 
articulate in full the remedies available. Of those limited number that provided information 
on the redress available to individuals who have an internal review upheld, the most common 
remedies included: compensation, apology, and a formal re-consideration of the decision.  
 
6. Does the complaint-handler publicise the results of internal reviews eg in the Annual 
report? 
As is frequently argued by ombudsman schemes themselves in much of their guidance and 
contributions to wider debates on complaint-handling in general, an important stage in the 
complaint-handling cycle that should be included is one where the lessons from complaints 
are learned and acted upon. A degree of evidence that this is occurring, and evidence that the 
process is taken seriously, can be provided through the publication of performance figures on 
the internal review process and the outcomes. 
Of the 28 schemes tested that advertised their internal review process on the website, we 
found that only 13 publicise the outcome of successful internal reviews on their websites 
and/or in their annual reports. An example of good practice can be found with Ofsted, who 
have an external reviewer who considers the internal reviews against Ofsted. The external 
reviewer is part of a separate entity that displays its decisions on its website and produces its 
own annual reports. This makes the complaints about Ofsted clearly accessible to individuals 
considering launching a complaint.  
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7. Does the complaint-handler employ an external reviewer or attempt to build chinese walls 
into the internal review process? 
The use of external reviewer to deal with complaints about the service provided by 
complaint-handlers is a relatively new innovation. Specific guidance on this procedural 
option appears absent from the general guidance on good complaint-handling that emanates 
from the OA and ombudsman schemes themselves, but the practice was discussed in a 
ZRUNVKRSDWWKH2$¶V2013 conference.     
Of the 28 schemes tested in this research that advertised their internal review process on 
the website, only 5 employ an external reviewer.15 Given the element of independence that 
the employment of such a figure provides and the subsequent added credence it adds to the 
process, it is unsurprising that the use of the external reviewer was advertised on all the 
relevant websites.  
A further 7 schemes identified in this study operate with a quasi-independent review 
mechanism. This is where an individual is employed internally within the ombudsman or 
complaint-handler, howeveUWKDWLQGLYLGXDO¶V sole role is to work on and review the internal 
complaints. This arrangement entails that the review is conducted by an individual whose 
predominant role is not conducting investigations and who has not been involved in the initial 
complaint.  
Of the remaining schemes that did not clarify the process of internal review on the website, 
it is probable that others operate in a manner aimed at reducing bias and increasing creditably 
of the review scheme. For example, different case reviewers and/or senior management will 
be allocated responsibility to conduct internal reviews, with every effort made to separate the 
matter from the original investigator or member of staff complained against.  
 
Conclusions: The future of standard setting in the complaints branch 
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Complaint-handling is a curious but essential component of the modern justice system, 
whether that be in the civil or administrative justice sector. It would be incorrect to describe 
the complaints branch as being unregulated, but the degree of control that is exercised over 
the system is spread across a range of mechanisms with no one party exercising full 
responsibility. Ad hocery is rife in the sector and although the judiciary has pronounced their 
opinion on some aspects of the procedural safeguards adopted in the complaints branch, the 
law provides little guidance on the specific issues of transparency and internal review that 
have been explored in this article. The most informative direction is provided by the OA, but 
the extent to which that guidance can be used as a standard bearer for the complaints branch 
is restricted by its organisational need to accommodate a wide variety of disparate complaint 
schemes. 
What this article has shown, however, is that notwithstanding the lack of coordinated 
standard setting in the complaints branch, best practice is advancing. Moreover, that best 
practice is potentially capable of meeting some of the lead concerns that have been levelled at 
the quality of justice delivered in the complaints branch.  
With regard to transparency, we found considerable evidence of the use of codes to 
provide a formal template for the manner in which complaint-handling schemes applied their 
remit. The use of codes, and their publication, remains in the minority but some of the codes 
employed have only been introduced in recent years. Alongside the increased use of codes in 
the complaints branch, there is a much greater likelihood of decisions being published than 
10 years ago, with two of the largest ombudsman schemes having introduced a policy of 
publication during 2013. The willingness to adopt such a policy requires an ombudsman 
scheme to embrace the need to demonstrate consistency in decision-making, thus acting as an 
incentive to high standards. The amount of internal upgrading of the quality control 
mechanisms within an organisation required to make such a policy publically robust should 
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not be underestimated. Where implanted in tandem, the effectiveness of a publication strategy 
involving both codes and decisions requires further scrutiny, but potentially it serves an 
important accountability function on a number of levels and could help promote better 
understanding of the work of the complaint-handlers.  
The value of internal reviews is a more contentious issue, but building into the complaints-
handling model an additional layer of accountability also serves as a positive incentive to 
enhance standards in the sector. Such processes have probably always been in place but until 
recently were poorly advertised. Investing resources in internal reviews carries risks, as well 
as costs but, where made a centrepiece of the complaint-handler¶s relationship with 
complainants, it operates as a statement of confidence in the service provided. In this respect, 
the strongest statement that a scheme is taking the process of review seriously is to employ an 
external reviewer to manage the process and ideally to report back generic findings on an 
annual basis. 
What we found in our research was that more work could be done by complaint-handlers 
to be transparent about the internal review services that they offered. Indeed, ironically given 
current debates about using complaint systems as learning processes, we found little 
publically stated acknowledgement that internal reviews were being used to improve the 
quality of service provide. Nevertheless, internal review processes do lead to changes in 
decisions on many occasions and the model of the external reviewer is steadily becoming 
embedded in the complaints branch. 
The development of greater openness and more sophisticated internal review models in the 
complaints branch is a positive development. Care must be taken to generalise such standards 
to all complaints-handling bodies given the diversity in the sector, but such developments 
suggest that there is potential for the complaints branch to make a more robust claim about 
the procedural safeguards it employs.   
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Notes  
1.  For an analysis of the likely impact of some of these developments see the contributions to the special 
edition of the Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law [2013] 35:1.  
 6HH WKH 3XEOLF $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ 6HOHFW &RPPLWWHH¶V LQTXLU\ RQ Complaints: Do they make a difference? 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-
select-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/complaints-handling/complaints-do-they-make-a-difference/ 
3. The internet provides a convenient source of anti-ombudsman sentiment, see www.ombudsmanwatch.org/. 
See also submissions to the Select Committee for Communities and Local Government (CLG 2012) and the 
3XEOLF $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ 6HOHFW &RPPLWWHH¶V LQTXLU\ RQ WKH Parliamentary Ombudsman Service, 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-
select-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/complaints-handling/parliaments-ombudsman-service/ . 
4. This does not include the ability of the complainant to challenge the decision of the ombudsman in the courts. 
5. For instance, for the last three recorded years there have been 28 applications for judicial review against the 
LGO and none have been successful in court, indeed only three have made it passed the permission stage 
(Thomas et al 2013, p. 72). 
6. For instance, in 2011-12 the LGO processed 986 requests for internal review (LGO 2012, p. 28).  
7. Eg. For 2011/12, in 70 cases out of 986 the LGO changed its response as a result of an internal complaint 
(LGO 2012, p. 28).  
7KH$VVRFLDWLRQ¶VQDPHZDVFKDQJHGLQIURPWhe British and Irish Ombudsman Association.  
9.  See the Ombudsman Association website, http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org/association-objects.php 
10. This was because either the website was not functioning at the time of the research or because the 
complaint-handling function was a very small part of a larger regulatory function.  
11. These were: the Charity Commission, the Professional Conduct Committee for the Bar Standards Board, the 
Independent Complaints Resolution Service, Ofcom, the Judicial Conduct Investigation Office (formerly the 
Office of Judicial Complaints), Ofsted and the Prisoner Ombudsman for Northern Ireland.  
12. The study was undertaken in Autumn 2013. 
13. http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk/downloads/documents/publications/Formal-Complaint-Template.pdf 
7KLVFDQEHWKHFDVHHYHQZKHQDFRPSODLQDQW¶VQDPHLVDQRQ\PLVHGLIWKHSDUWLFXODUIDFWVRIWKHFDVHDUHVR
unique in nature that the individual involved could be easily traced.  
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15. These were the Financial Ombudsman Service, the Property Ombudsman, the Insolvency Service, Ofsted 
and the Scottish Public Sector Ombudsman. 
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